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OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
If the origin of an ordinary disease of life cannot be traced to the employment as its proximate cause, aggravation of the disease is not compensable as an occupational disease. Ashland Oil Company v. Bean, 225 Va. 1, 3-4, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983). A disease that is merely aggravated by the employment does not establish causation and is not an occupational disease. Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean, 225 Va. 1, 3-4, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983).
A claimant must prove the existence of an occupational disease by a preponderance of the evidence. Virginia Dep't of State Police v. Talbert, 1 Va. App. 250, 253, 337 S.E.2d 307, 308(1985).
An occupational disease is one "arising out of and in the course of employment." Code Sec. 65.2-400(A). "A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment" when the evidence establishes six elements. Code Sec. 65.2-400(B). Elements (2) and(6) require evidence showing "[a] direct causal connection between the conditions under which work is performed and the occupational disease" and that the disease "had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and flowed from that source as a natural consequence. . . ." Code Sec. 65.2-400(B)(1) and (B)(6).
"Employment" in this section means the work or process in which the worker was engaged and not the contract of employment with the employer. Pocahontas Fuel Co. v. Godbey, 192 Va. 845, 66 S.E.2d 859 (1951).
Impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive motion, whether labeled injuries or diseases or however defined, are, as a matter of law, are not compensable under the present provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996).
A florist's gradually incurred allergic contact dermatitis is a compensable "disease" under the Act. First, holding that florist's allergic contact dermatitis qualifies as a disease would not threaten the coherence of the existing distinction between "injuries by accident" and "occupational diseases." The development of an allergic sensitivity to floral allergens cannot be confused with an "injury" because it is not a "mechanical or structural change in the body." Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Cogbill, 223 Va.354, 356, 288 S.E.2d 485, 486 (1982) (stating that an injury is "an obvious . . . mechanical or structural change in the body"). Claimant's allergic contact dermatitis occurred as a result of exposure to a chemical contained in two flowers: alstroemeria and tulips. Through a process that involved neither "repetitive motion" nor "cumulative trauma," the chemical reacted with claimant's antibodies in a way that caused her immune system to develop a hypersensitivity to the chemical. Although claimant's allergic sensitivity to the allergen in these flowers had a physical manifestation -- the contact dermatitis on her hands and arms -- her underlying problem cannot be understood as an "injury." Unlike prior attempts to set forth all-purpose definitions of disease, narrowly holding that a florist's allergic contact dermatitis is within the General Assembly's intended meaning of "disease" does not render the two categories of ailments "unnecessary and meaningless," Holly Farms/Federal Co. v. Yancey, 228 Va. 337, 341, 321 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1984), or threaten to convert the Act into "a general plan of health insurance." Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 584, 385 S.E.2d 858, 862 (1989). A New Leaf, Inc. v. Elaine R. Webb, 257 Va. 190, 511 S.E.2d 102 (1999). WP Version.
In United Airlines, Inc. v. Walter, 24 Va. App. 394, 396-97, 482 S.E.2d 849, 850-51 (1997), the Court of Appeals held that photosensitivity to fluorescent lighting is an injury rather than a disease.
Sec. 65.2-400(C) was amended in 1997 to state that "[h]earing loss and the condition of carpal tunnel syndrome are not occupational diseases but are ordinary diseases of life as defined in [Code] Sec. 65.2-401."
For an ordinary disease of life to be compensable under Code Sec. 65.2-401, a claimant must prove by "clear and convincing evidence, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that the disease (1) arose out of and in the course of his employment,(2) did not result from causes outside of the employment, and (3) follows as an incident of an occupational disease, is an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the course of the employments listed in Code Sec. 65.2-401(2)(b), or is characteristic of the employment and was caused by conditions peculiar to the employment. See Chanin v. Eastern Virginia Medical School, 20 Va. App. 587, 589, 459 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1995).
An "ordinary disease of life" is a disease "to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment." See Code Sec. 65.2-401. To recover compensation for an ordinary disease of life as an occupational disease, a claimant must establish "by clear and convincing evidence, to a reasonable medical certainty, that [his illness] arose out of and in the course of his employment." Code Sec. 65.2-401.
In 1997, the General Assembly amended Code Sec. 65.2-400 to provide that "condition[s] of carpal tunnel syndrome are not occupational diseases but are ordinary diseases of life as defined in [Code] Sec. 65.2-401." The General Assembly also amended Code Sec. 65.2-401 to provide that the elements required to prove a compensable ordinary disease of life must be "established by clear and convincing evidence, (not a mere probability)." The Court of Appeals noted that the amendment deleted from the statute the words "to a reasonable medical certainty." The current statutory standard is well defined in Virginia. Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as "that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal." Walker Agcy. & Aetna Cas. Co. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 540-41, 211S.E.2d 88, 92 (1975) (citation omitted). The commission could properly conclude that the elements of compensable CTS had been established by clear and convincing evidence where the uncontradicted opinion of a physician was that "there is a high probability that the carpal tunnel is a result of her work environment." National Fruit Product Company, Inc. v. Brenda Staton, 28 Va. App. 650, 507 S.E.2d 667 (1998), Record No. 1704-98-4 (December 15, 1998), aff'd, National Fruit Product Co. v. Staton, Record No. 990428 (Va. S.Ct. March 2, 2000). WP Version. (The Court of Appeals did not err in determining that "high probability" is equivalent to "clear and convincing evidence (not a mere probability)" within the context of Code Sec. 65.2-401.)
The commission did not err in finding that claimant proved by clear and convincing evidence, as required by Code Sec. 65.2-401, that her right carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by her employment. Claimant, an auditor, used her right hand to input the day's revenue and room charges on a machine called a "micro." She operated the micro between one and three hours per shift, depending on how busy the resort was on a given day. She testified that due to the set-up of the work station, she was required to place her right hand at a forty-five degree angle while using her fingers to key in the data. The micro is a computerized cash register with a keyboard for entering data and a slot for entering invoices or "folios." Claimant's neurosurgeon noted that claimant's "day-to-day work involves using an instrument called a 'micros' which is a type of computerized cash register. She has repetitive movements that have precipitated and aggravated the carpal tunnel syndrome, with which she presently presents." The neurosurgeon opined that "[h]er symptoms developed and became aggravated as she was using . . . an instrument called a micros, which I understand is a computerized cash register. This type of hand problem is commonly associated with this type of repetitive occupational trauma." No evidence proved that claimant had carpal tunnel syndrome or experienced symptoms related to the disease prior to her work and no evidence proved that any causes outside her work contributed to cause the condition. Furthermore, no evidence proved that carpal tunnel syndrome is a condition which may lie dormant and only become symptomatic when external aggravating factors are brought to bear. "Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is defined as: a complex of symptoms resulting from compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, with pain and burning or tingling paresthesias in the fingers and hand, sometimes extending to the elbow." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1289 (26th ed. 1985). Since 1997, the Code has provided that "'condition[s] of carpal tunnel syndrome are not occupational diseases but are ordinary diseases of life as defined in [Code] Sec. 65.2-401.'" National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Staton, 28 Va. App. 650, 654, 507 S.E.2d 667, 669 (1998). For an ordinary disease of life to be compensable, a claimant must prove by "clear and convincing evidence, (not mere probability)" that the disease (1) arose out of and in the course of his employment, (2) did not result from causes outside of the employment, and (3) follows as an incident of an occupational disease, is an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the course of the employment listed in Code Sec. 65.2-401(2)(b), or is characteristic of the employment and was caused by conditions peculiar to the employment. Code Sec. 65.2-401; see also Lindenfield v. City of Richmond Sheriff's Office, 25 Va. App. 775, 784, 492 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1997). However, disability resulting from work-related aggravation of a pre-existing disease is not compensable. See Ashland Oil Co. v. Bean, 225 Va. 1, 3-4, 300 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1983) (per curiam). "Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as 'that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.'" National Fruit, 28 Va. App. at 654, 507 S.E.2d at 669 (citations omitted). Based upon the neurosurgeon's statements in his letters, the commission reasonably found that "claimant's employment was the 'precipitating' factor which caused [her carpal tunnel syndrome] to 'develop.'" "Precipitate" is defined as "to cause to move or act very rapidly"; "to cause to happen or come to a crisis suddenly or unexpectedly." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1784 (1993). Based upon the neurosurgeon's opinions and claimant's testimony, the commission, as the trier of facts, could conclude that the evidence proved clearly and convincingly that (1) the repetitive trauma at work caused the right carpal tunnel syndrome and (2) that prior to the repetitive trauma at work, claimant did not have right carpal tunnel syndrome and did not engage in repetitive activity outside work that caused or contributed to cause the development of this ordinary disease of life. Great Eastern Resort Corporation v. Gordon, Record No. 1682-99-3 (February 29, 2000). WP Version.
MCS is an ordinary disease of life because it is a disease to which the general public is exposed outside of employment. For an ordinary disease of life to be compensable under Sec. 65.2-401, claimant must establish by "clear and convincing evidence, to a reasonable medical certainty" that the disease (1) arose out of and in the course of employment, (2) did not result from causes outside of the employment, and (3) follows as an incident of an occupational disease, is an infectious disease or contagious disease contracted in the course of employment, or is characteristic of employment and was caused by conditions peculiar to the employment. Island Creek Coal v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 11, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988). Where claimant's expert testimony was based on an incorrect understanding of the facts of the claimant's work environment, claimant spent only fifty percent of her time at the workplace, was exposed to the aggravating chemicals outside of work, no doctor isolated the chemical(s) causing the sensitivity (While the statute does not require that a single source of the claimant's disease be pinpointed, it does require that the "primary source [be] determined by 'reasonable medical certainty.'" Ross Laboratories v. Barbour, 13 Va. App. 373, 377, 412 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1991). Such a determination must be based on evidence that "it is at least more probable than not that the disease arose out of and in the course of employment." Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Campbell, 7 Va. App. 217, 224, 372 S.E.2d 411, 416 (1988)), and claimant offered no evidence of chemicals in her work environment. Because no evidence exists of chemical exposure in claimant's employment environment, claimant did not meet her burden of proving by "clear and convincing evidence" to a reasonable medical certainty that her disease arose out of and in the course of her employment, as required by Code Sec. 65.2-401. Chanin v. Eastern Virginia Medical School, 20 Va. App. 587, 589, 459 S.E.2d 523, 524 (1995).
The General Assembly, by enacting Code Sec. 65.2-402, expressly indicated its intent that occupational "heart disease" will be included as a compensable "disease." Even if all heart disease is caused gradually by the process of trauma, the General Assembly has expressly removed this ailment from those cumulative trauma conditions that are otherwise not compensable as a "disease" when it is incurred by the public servants enumerated in the statute. City of Hopewell v. Michael W. Tirpak, Record No. 1369-97-2, July 28, 1998.
Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 14 Va. App. 45, 415 S.E.2d 596 (1992) recognized that "purely psychological disability resulting from disagreements over managerial decisions and conflicts with supervisory personnel that cause stressful consequences which result in purely psychological disability ordinarily are not compensable." Id. at 49, 415 S.E.2d at 598.
Psychological Injury. Claimant was trapped in an elevator for two hours and claimed post traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD) as a result. Claimant did not suffer from claustrophobia and did not require any immediate medical treatment after the incident. "To qualify as a compensable injury by accident, a purely psychological injury must be causally related to a physical injury or to a sudden shock or fright arising in the course of employment." Id. at 88, 515 S.E.2d at 349 (citing Chesterfield County Fire Dept. v. Dunn, 9 Va. App. 475, 477, 389 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1990) (citing Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 209-11, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293-94 (1941))). Specifically, "post-traumatic stress disorder is a compensable injury" within the meaning of the workers' compensation statute "if caused by either a physical injury or an obvious sudden shock or fright arising in the course of employment." Daniel Constr. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va. App. 70, 77, 480 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1997). In the present case, the incident of August 11, 1997, as described by claimant, does not rise to the level of an obvious fright or sudden shock as contemplated in Hercules v. Gunther, 13 Va. App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991), or Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941). The evidence supports the commission's determination that although claimant may have experienced "discomfort and anxiety" from being trapped in the elevator for two hours, the event was not "unexpected, shocking, or catastrophic" so as to qualify as a compensable psychological injury. Credible evidence also supports the commission's determination that claimant failed to prove she suffered from a compensable occupational disease. Here, the medical evidence demonstrated a long-term history of psychological problems, the death of the claimant's father shortly before she was trapped in the elevator, and the commission was not required to accept the opinion of the treating physician when countered by other evidence. Accordingly, the commission did not err in finding that claimant's PTSD was not an aggravation of an ordinary disease of life. See Owens v. Virginia Dept. of Transp., 30 Va. App. 85, 88, 515 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1999) (holding that the sound of a falling utility cover was not an unexpected event and that the evidence was insufficient to prove an aggravation of claimant's pre-existing PTSD). Linda L. Hill v. Travelodge and Selective Ins. Co., Record No. 0653-99-2 (December 28, 1999). WP Version.
Asthma. The Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) did not err in finding that claimant failed to prove that his asthma constituted a compensable occupational disease. A claimant must prove the existence of an occupational disease by a preponderance of the evidence. See Virginia Dep't of State Police v. Talbert, 1 Va. App. 250, 253, 337 S.E.2d 307, 308 (1985). The commission treated claimant's asthma as an ordinary disease of life pursuant to Code Sec. 65.2-401. Claimant did not challenge that classification. For an ordinary disease of life to be treated as a compensable occupational disease, claimant had to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that his asthma arose out of and in the course of his employment, did not result from causes outside of his employment, was characteristic of his employment, and was caused by the conditions peculiar to his employment. See Teasley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 14 Va. App. 45, 49-50, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992); see also Code Sec. 65.2-401. While one doctor indicated that the claimant had occupational asthma from his recent employment, a review of his office notes fails to indicate any specific exposure that the claimant had. There is no mention of solvents or bronze dust as the claimant testified. In fact, his notes merely reflect that the claimant suspected it is the work that is causing the condition but specifically noted he could not pinpoint any source of irritation at work. A report from another doctor indicated exposure to bronze dust with a causal connection, but this was based solely on the history provided by the claimant and the assumption that the claimant operates a bronze machine. The history provided by claimant was suspect. The claimant did not operate nor work in the bronzing machine area. He did, however, place the borders on such cards. The testimony of the claimant and a coworker were contradictory concerning the amount of dust in the area . . . . [T]he study of the air quality failed to find sufficient particles of bronze dust or solvents in either the claimant's work area or the room where the press was located. Claimant had prior non work-related respiratory problems. There were various histories throughout the years concerning the claimant's wheezing when exposed to various potential allergens. The claimant did not appear to be forthright in his testimony concerning some of these previous difficulties. There were conflicting reports in the medical records and the claimant's testimony concerning his cigarette usage. The various medical reports noted tobacco-related bronchiolitis. When presented with additional information, the other doctor indicated that he could not say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the work exposure was the primary cause of the claimant's condition. The commission was entitled to discount the other doctor's opinion of causation in light of the conflicts between his report and the witnesses' testimony and his uncertainty in his opinion when confronted with additional information. Phillip A. Carper v. National Wildlife Fed., Record No. 1442-99-4 (February 15, 2000). WP Version.
Last Injurious Exposure
Code Sec. 65.2-404 states that "the employer in whose employment [the employee] was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of the disease and the employer's insurance carrier, if any, at the time of the exposure, shall alone be liable . . . , without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier." By its terms, Code Sec. 65.2-404 addresses only the liability of the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed, and its insurance carrier, in contradistinction to prior employers and their insurance carriers. Code Sec. 65.2-404 identifies the employer that is to be held liable and excludes prior employers from liability. See Cooper v. Mary E. Coal Corp., 215 Va. 806, 214 S.E.2d 162 (1975); Uninsured Employer's Fund v. Harold C. Mounts, Record No. 2116-96-3 (April 22, 1997), 24 Va. App. 552, 484 S.E.2d 140 (1997), aff'd, 255 Va. 254, 497 S.E.2d 464 (1998) WP Version.
The Commission properly denied claims for an award of benefits for asbestosis, an occupational disease, on the ground that claimants failed to prove that they were last injuriously exposed to asbestos at a jobsite while employed by employer where they made no contemporaneous reports of asbestos, and more credible testimony established no asbestos had been used. Oscar R. White, et al. v. C. J. Coakley Company, Inc., Record No. 2345-98-2 (May 4, 1999). WP Version.
Communication.
An occupational disease is not compensable under the Act until a diagnosis of the occupational disease has been communicated to the employee. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 9, 365 S.E.2d 782, 787 (1988); Code Sec. 65.2-403. "The diagnosis need not contain precise medical terminology as long as the diagnosis is definite and informs the claimant in clear and understandable language that he or she is suffering from a disease that arises out of and in the course of employment." Via v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 10 Va. App. 572, 576, 394 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1990).
A physician's diagnosis of an employee's condition is not dispositive on the issue of compensability and physicians often reach different conclusions about a condition's origin. [O]nce an employee receives a communication of an occupational disease, it is incumbent upon that employee to file a claim. Once a claim is filed, it is the duty of the Commission to determine: (1) whether the disease is in fact an "occupational disease" as defined in Code Sec. 65.1-46, and if so, (2) whether that occupational disease is compensable. Parris v. Appalachian Power Co., 2 Va. App. 219, 225-26, 343 S.E.2d 455, 458-59 (1986).
Code Sec. 65.2-406 (A)(5) does not require that an employee receive from a physician a communication that his disease is work related; rather, the statute only requires that the employee, simultaneously with or sometime after the diagnosis of his condition, learn that the condition is an occupational disease for which compensation may be awarded. See Ratliff v. Dominion Coal Co., 3 Va. App. 175, 349 S.E.2d 147 (1986) (where the Court held that a 1979 letter from the Department of Labor was "a medical determination of total disability due to pneumoconiosis," so as to trigger not only the running of the three year limitation period under the federal law but also under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act). In Ratliff, the Court rejected the claimant's argument that a letter from the Department of Labor was an administrative or legal determination, not a "medical determination." Id.
Code Sec. 65.2-406(A)(5) requires that a claimant file for compensation for an occupational disease within "two years after a diagnosis . . . is first communicated to the employee . . . ."The statute "does not require that an employee receive from a physician a communication that his disease is work related." It requires only that he "learn that the condition is an occupational disease for which compensation may be awarded." "Whether a diagnosis of an occupational disease was communicated and when the communication occurred are factual determinations." City of Richmond Police Dep't v. Bass, 26 Va. App. 121, 131-32,493 S.E.2d 661, 666 (1997) (citations omitted). Where credible evidence established that as early as October 1990, claimant knew that her contact dermatitis was a disease that might be caused by her wearing latex gloves at work, and claimant at that time, took immediate precautions to avoid exposure to latex gloves at work, but did not file her claim until 1997, her claim seeking an award of compensation for an occupational disease of contact dermatitis was not timely filed. Kathryne Smith v. Fairfax Hospital and Inova Health System Foundation, Inc., Record No. 1681-98-4 (Ct. of Appeals, December 8, 1998).
Possibility not enough. "Possible pneumoconiosis." An opinion that an employee "may have pneumoconiosis," Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Pannell, 203 Va. 49, 51, 122 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1961), is not a positive diagnosis of an occupational disease because it "would indicate that claimant might or might not have had pneumoconiosis." Id. at 52, 122 S.E.2d at 669. Such a diagnosis is "not sufficiently definite to apprise [an employee] that he had contracted the disease." Id. Consequently, the court held that this "tentative diagnosis will not trigger the running of the limitation period." Via v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 10 Va. App. 572, 576, 394 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1990).
Citing Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Vance, 203 Va. 557, 125 S.E.2d 879 (1962), the Fund contends that, as a matter of law, Mounts' illiteracy "has no impact on the effectiveness of the communication of the knowledge imparted by the written report." We disagree with the Fund's interpretation of Vance. Although Vance "could neither read nor write," id. at 558, 125 S.E.2d at 880, a witness testified that he heard a personnel office employee explain the physician's report to Vance, tell Vance that his chest examination was below the required physical standards, and inform Vance that Vance "'would have to waive his right to claim compensation for silicosis or any aggravation of it.'" Id. at 559, 125 S.E.2d at 880. The witness testified that Vance deliberated for more than thirty minutes and then signed the waiver. See id. On this evidence, the Court held that "the Commission found as a fact that [Vance] executed the waiver under the circumstances related by [the witness], and . . . this finding is binding on [appeal]." Id. at 559, 125 S.E.2d at 881 (emphasis added). Uninsured Employer's Fund v. Harold C. Mounts, Record No. 2116-96-3 (April 22, 1997), 24 Va. App. 552, 484 S.E.2d 140 (1997), aff'd, 255 Va. 254, 497 S.E.2d 464 (1998) WP Version.
Under settled principles, an occupational disease is compensable under the Act when a diagnosis of occupational disease is communicated to the employee. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 9, 365 S.E.2d 782, 787 (1988); Code Sec. 65.2-403. Claimant testified that in his discussions with his treating physician after claimant's admission to the hospital that his doctor told him that his work was responsible for his heart problem. Based on this evidence, the commission found "that [the doctor] told [claimant] his work was responsible for his heart condition," quoting claimant's testimony that he and his doctor had "talked about it two or three different times" during the course of his hospitalization and surgery. Claimant proved his entitlement to benefits accrued on January 18, 1996, the date of his myocardial infarction and the date of communication to him by his doctor. Tazewell County Sheriff's Office v. Owens, Record No. 0005-99-3 (June 29,1999). WP Version.
Dr. DeLorenzo opined that Hudson suffers from "a peripheral neuropathy with both sensory and motor components, as well as evidence of central nervous system damage . . . probably . . . in the spinal cord . . . called a myelopathy." Dr. DeLorenzo testified that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the damage to Hudson's nervous system was caused by his unprotected exposure to paint solvents and chemicals in the workplace. Dr. DeLorenzo opined that Hudson's condition could have been caused by "one or two very large exposures in the workplace, which it's my understanding that that happened . . . or [by] chronic accumulation." Dr. DeLorenzo stated that Hudson's condition was probably due to both causes and was "[d]efinitely not" due to an idiopathic cause. Dr. DeLorenzo stated that Hudson's condition was attributable to either situation or both. Based upon Hudson's testimony and Dr. DeLorenzo's opinions, the commission properly concluded that "the particular event on June 1, 1995 produced a definitive change in [Hudson's] condition, such that it suddenly and unexpectedly produced the myriad effects in [Hudson's] central nervous system that significantly altered his condition." The Supreme Court's recent decision in A New Leaf, Inc. v. Webb, 257 Va. 190, 511 S.E.2d 102 (1999) WP Version, is dispositive of this issue. In Webb, the Supreme Court held that a florist's allergic contact dermatitis was compensable as an occupational disease because it was caused by a reaction to allergens in certain flowers encountered in the claimant's job as a florist, not by cumulative trauma induced by repetitive motion. See id. at 192, 511 S.E.2d at 102. Credible medical evidence, including the medical records and opinions of Dr. DeLorenzo, proved that Hudson's polyneuropathy or peripheral neuropathy was caused by the reaction of his body to unprotected high exposure to paint solvents and chemicals in the workplace, whether over an extended period of time or over several large exposures. No evidence established that Hudson's condition was caused by cumulative trauma induced by repetitive motion. Accordingly, the commission did not err in holding that Hudson's condition is a compensable occupational disease within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act. Hudson Venetian Blind Service, Inc. v. Donald A. Hudson, Record No. 1611-98-2 (May 18, 1999). WP Version.
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